own motion to decide admissibility, the Prosecutor has the burden of showing admissibility. 11 In the absence of a statutory standard of proof, 12 the jurisprudence has required "evidence of a sufficient degree of specificity and probative value".
13
Since Katanga, the Appeals Chamber has confirmed that admissibility must be determined "on the basis of the factual situation […] at the time of the proceedings concerning the admissibility challenge", not, for instance, at the time of the issuance of the warrant of arrest. 14 The Appeals
Chamber held: "The Statute assumes that the factual situation on the basis of which the admissibility of a case is established is not necessarily static, but ambulatory". 15 Pre-Trial Chamber I clarified: "a decision on the admissibility of the case must be based on the circumstances prevailing at the time of its issuance", 16 suggesting that a Chamber could even consider factual developments occurring after the parties and participants have completed their submissions.
II. The existence of an "investigation or prosecution"

17
The first step of the test asks: "(1) whether there are ongoing investigations or prosecutions, or (2)
whether there have been investigations in the past, and the State having jurisdiction has decided not to prosecute the person concerned". 18 An affirmative answer to either question means the case is note 2, at para. 29. 10 Trial Chamber III, 24 June 2010, ICC-01/05-01/08-802 ("Bemba Decision"), at para. 204. 11 Pre-Trial Chamber I, 6 July 2007, ICC-01/04-01/07-4, at para. 9 et seq. 12 Pre-Trial Chamber I held none of the standards of proof explicitly set out in the Statute apply to admissibility. Gaddafi Decision, supra note 2, at para. 54 . 13 Ruto Judgment, supra note 2, at para. 62; Kenyatta Judgment, supra note 2, at para. 61; Simone Gbagbo Judgment, supra note 2, at para. 29. 14 Katanga Judgment, supra note 2, at para. 56. 15 Ibid. As such, the "time of proceedings" appears to refer to the moment when the challenge is raised by a person or a prosecute" within the meaning of Article 17(1)(b).
22
A.
An "ongoing investigation"
The Appeals Chamber has defined the Article 17(1)(a) phrase "the case is being investigated" as requiring investigative steps "directed at ascertaining" whether the person is responsible for the alleged conduct, "for instance by interviewing witnesses or suspects, collecting documentary evidence, or carrying out forensic analyses". 23 The "mere preparedness to take such steps" is not sufficient -the investigative steps need to be actually taken. 24 Furthermore, the investigation must relate to the "case", rather than being investigation in an abstract sense. 25 The Appeals Chamber in
Gaddafi held that to establish an investigation is underway at the domestic level, the "the contours of the case being investigated […] must be clear", irrespective of the stage of the investigation.
26
In Simone Gbagbo, the Appeals Chamber upheld Pre-Trial Chamber I's finding based on a lack of any "tangible, concrete and progressive investigative steps" into criminal responsibility for the crimes alleged in the proceedings before the Court or a prosecution for these alleged crimes. 27 Pre- 25 Ruto Judgment, supra note 2, at para. 37; Kenyatta Judgment, supra note 2, at para. 36. 26 Gaddafi Judgment, supra note 2, at paras 83-84. The Al-Senussi case was found inadmissible due to ongoing national prosecution. 27 Simone Gbagbo Decision, supra note 2, at paras 36, 78-79. witnesses or between the suspect and the parties civiles, or ordering any necessary forensic or other expertise concerning the crimes committed". 28 The Appeals Chamber upheld as reasonable Pre-Trial Chamber I's conclusion that "the investigative steps, in view of their number and frequency, were "sparse and disparate"".
29
B. "Substantially the same conduct"
Since the Ruto and Kenyatta judgments, the Appeals Chamber has required that "substantially" the same conduct is being investigated or prosecuted in the domestic and ICC proceedings. 30 According to the Appeals Chamber, the relevant "conduct" is "defined by the warrant of arrest or summons to Simone Gbagbo Judgment, supra note 2, at para. 98; Gaddafi Judgment, supra note 2, at para. 83. The jurisprudence now treats the "same person" test as an aspect of the "substantially the same case" requirement. A Chamber simply verifies that the domestic proceedings refer to the specific individual subject to ICC proceedings. The "same person, same conduct" test derives from the wording of the arrest warrant in the Lubanga case. See Pre-Trial Chamber I, 10 February 2006, ICC-01/04-01/07-520-Anx2, ("Lubanga Arrest Warrant Decision"), at para. 31: "it is a conditio sine qua non for a case arising from the investigation of a situation to be inadmissible that national proceedings encompass both the person and the conduct which is the subject of the case before the Court."
the domestic and ICC proceedings, 36 which appears to have been one of the considerations underlying earlier references to the words "same person".
37
The Appeals Chamber held that the legal characterisation of the conduct as a particular "crime" is not determinative, and at the domestic level it need not be described as an "international crime". 38 The conduct in the domestic proceedings may be considered to be the same, even if the investigation or proceedings are based on different crimes or result in different charges. 39 However, in Simone Gbagbo, Pre-Trial Chamber I did refer to "crimes of the same nature", 40 the Appeals Chamber stating that Pre-Trial Chamber I had "primarily based its findings on the alleged conduct underlying the crimes and considered their legal characterisation as an added indicator of the actual subject matter of the domestic proceedings". 41 In the Libya Judgments, Judge Ušacka opined separately that Pre-Trial Chamber I's test followed the Appeals Chamber's two-step structure, but incorrectly applied the first step of the test, representing perhaps the most significant dissent on this issue in the ICC jurisprudence to date.
42
III. Whether the State is "unwilling or unable"
During the second step of the test, there is a presumption in favour of the domestic jurisdiction. 43 The
Simone Gbagbo Judgment has confirmed that this presumption does not apply during the first step.
44
36 Pre-Trial Chamber II considered the "same person" requirement in rejecting Kenya's proposal to investigate "persons at the same level in the hierarchy being investigated by the ICC" as a misleading interpretation of the requirement. The Chamber stated that "during the "case" stage, admissibility determination must be assessed against national proceedings related to those particular persons that are subject to the Court's proceedings". Trial Chamber I also held that unjustified delay must be determined "not against an abstract ideal of justice, but against the specific circumstances surrounding the investigation concerned", leaving scope for new fact patterns to develop the two-step test in this regard.
47
In relation to the chapeau requirement of Article 17(2) concerning "the principles of due process recognized by international law", the Appeals Chamber held that "the Court was not established to be an international court of human rights, sitting in judgment over domestic legal systems to ensure that they are compliant with international standards of human rights." 48 The Appeals Chamber interpreted Article 17(2)(c) as requiring that "the proceedings were not or are not being conducted independently or impartially and that the proceedings were or are being conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice." 49 This requirement did not involve an assessment of whether the due process rights of the suspect had been breached per se, 50 unless the violations of the rights of the suspect were "so egregious that the proceedings can no longer be regarded as being capable of providing any genuine form of justice". 51 Accordingly, in the existing jurisprudence, Article 17(2)(c) relates primarily to 45 Simone Gbagbo Judgment, supra note 2, at para. 29. The Appeals Chamber's interpretation clarifies the statutory wording "unable or unwilling genuinely". 46 Al-Senussi Decision, supra note 2, at para. 233: The relevant factors that the Court may consider include the chronology of domestic proceedings and the complexity of the case at hand. See Pre-Trial Chamber I, ICC-01/11-01/11-239, 7 December 2012. 47 Al-Senussi Decision, supra note 2, at para. 223. 48 Al-Senussi Judgment, supra note 2, at para. 219. Further, at para 225: The Appeals Chamber considered that the Court should not pass judgment on the "operation of national courts in general" or on the "penal system of a State". The negotiating history of the Statute points to the drafters having included this phrase "in order to introduce an element of objectivity to the assessment of unwillingness and to reduce the subjectivity that might creep into any assessment of the intent of the domestic authorities", according to: J. Holmes, "The Principle of Complementarity", in R. Lee (Ed.), The International Criminal Court, The Making of the Rome Statute (1999), at p. 50. 49 Al-Senussi Judgment, supra note 2, at paras 213, 230(1): "unwillingness" does not follow from the State's non-respect for fair trial rights. 50 Al-Senussi Judgment, supra note 2, at paras 220, 230(2). 51 Al-Senussi Judgment, supra note 2, at para. 230(3).
Chamber found that Libya was "genuinely unable" because: it could not secure the transfer of Gaddafi into state custody from his place of detention in Zintan, it lacked the capacity to obtain necessary testimony, there were significant practical impediments to securing legal representation for Gaddafi and its judicial and governmental authorities were unable to exercise full control over certain detention facilities and to provide adequate witness protection. 54 The Appeals Chamber did not reach the second step of the two-step test, having not found an "investigation or prosecution". 55 However,
Judge Song opined separately that Libya was investigating the same case, and the case was admissible, on the basis that Libya was unable to obtain custody over Gaddafi.
56
The factual parameters of the Al Senussi case were such that Pre-Trial Chamber I reached the contrary conclusion on Libya's inability and unwillingness. Pre-Trial Chamber I based its decision on "the absence of effective witness protection programmes and the difficulties faced by the national authorities in exercising control over certain detention facilities". 57 Although legal representation had not yet been implemented in the domestic case, Pre-Trial Chamber I was satisfied that several local lawyers had indicated their willingness to represent him. By contrast, in Gaddafi, there had been repeated unsuccessful attempts to secure legal representation. 58 The Appeals Chamber upheld the finding that the capacity of Libya to collect sufficient evidence was one of the relevant considerations, and it was substantiated by differences in the "geographical and temporal scope" of the cases under investigation, which impacted the amount and quality of evidence and testimony required. 59 Whereas the allegations in Gaddafi spanned events occurring across Libya, the case against Al-Senussi concerned conduct occurring only during the repression of Appeals Chamber has interpreted to mean "once it is in a position" to "actually assert a conflict of the operative part of the decision must pertain directly to a question on the admissibility of a case, it cannot be "indirectly or tangentially" linked thereto. 74 Lastly, appeals of admissibility decisions do not extend to facts which postdate the impugned admissibility decision.
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V.
The "gravity" requirement "Gravity" is also an aspect of Article 17 admissibility. 76 The Statute does not specify the degree of by the drafters was "to maximize the Court's deterrent effect", 80 while academics have argued that the purpose of the gravity provisions is "not to protect [S]tate sovereignty", rather they arise from "considerations of judicial economy". 81 In the context of authorisation of an investigation, Pre-Trial
Chamber II ruled that the reference to the insufficiency of gravity in article 17 "is actually an additional safeguard, which prevents the Court from investigating, prosecuting and trying peripheral cases". 82 Pre-Trial Chamber II has provided guidance as to the "gravity" required to initiate an investigation. which the Defence had filed as confidential and ex parte, the Appeals Chamber holding that it was for the Prosecutor to use such evidence to submit a request for review under Article 19(10). 85 However, this may point to a mechanical problem with the Statute's provisions, since this situation would require the Defence to disclose evidence to the Prosecution in order to trigger the review, but doing so would potentially compromise the fair trial rights of the accused, inter alia by revealing the litigation strategy of the Defence and likely implying a breach of legal professional privilege. This example simply highlights that whilst existing jurisprudence has settled the core approach to case admissibility, and further increases in legal certainty will only occur after novel fact patterns have come before the
